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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. MORTENSEN, 
and ALFRED TREDWAY, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORA- Case No. 8551 
TION OF AMERICA, a Utah 
corporation, CLEO H. BUL-




Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Joseph E. Jeppson, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CA'SE 
This is an action for libel and slander. The 
respondents, Richard H. Mortensen and Alfred 
Tredway, claim that the appellants, Life Insurance 
Corporation of America, Cleo H. Bullard and 
Richard Don Cafferty, defamed them resulting 
in general and special damages. The case was tried 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
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of Utah. ·Trial 'vas before Judge Joseph E. Jeppson 
an·d a jury. The trial Judge denied the motion of 
the appellants, Life Insurance Corporation of Am-
erica, Cleo H. Bullard, and Richard Don Cafferty 
to dismiss the respondents Complaint, at the close 
of Respondents Case, upon the ground of privileged 
communication. The trial Judge also denied appel-
lants' motion for a directed verdict. The jury ren-
dered a verdict against the appellants, Life In-
surance Corporation of America, Bullard, and Caf-
ferty and found that the plaintiff Tredway suffered 
general damages in the sum of $500.00 and the 
respondents, Mortensen suffered general damages 
in the sum of $1,000.00, and that the plaintiffs, 
Mortensen and Tredway, suffered special damages 
in the sum of $5,000.00 and the jury awarded the 
plaintiff jointly as prominant damages the sum of 
$2,000.00. A counterclaim of the appellant Life 
Insurance Corporation of America, which was re-
served, resulted in a judgment for the defendant, 
Life Insurance Corporation of America against 
Richard H. Mortensen in the sum of 42.05 and 
judgment against the respondent, Alfred Tredway, 
in the sum of $540.70. Judgment was entered on the 
verdict on the 7th day of June, 1956. Notice of 
Appeal was filed on the 28th day of June, 1956. The 
Designation of Record was filed on the lOth day 
of August, 1956 and Order Extending the Record 
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on Appeal to the 14th day of November, 1956, was 
entered on the 11th day of October, 1956. An Order 
extending the time for appellants brief to December 
24, 1956, was entered on the 7th day of December, 
1956. 
STAITEMEN1T OF FACTS 
For convenience: The plaintiff, Richard H. 
Mortensen shall hereinafter be referred to as Mor-
tensen. The plaintiff, Alfred Tredway, shall here-
inafter be referred to as Tredway. The defendant 
Life Insurance Corporation of America, shall here-
inafter be referred to as Licoa. The defendant, 
Richard Don Cafferty, shall hereinafter be referred 
to as Cafferty. The defendant, Charles P. Connally 
shall hereinafter be referred to as Connally. The 
Reliance National Life Insurance Company, the 
name of which appears hereinafter in the testimony, 
shall hereinafter be referred to as Reliance. 
Mortensen and Tredway were employed by 
Licoa in the latter part of 1954. Subsequent to their 
employment by Licoa, they entered into negotiation 
of a contract of employment with Reliance. 
On October 13, 1954 Mortensen and Tredway 
were licensed by the Insurance Department of the 
State of Utah under Reliance. On October 15, 1954, 
Licoa wrote a letter to the Insurance Department 
stating the licenses of Mortensen and Tredway 
should be terminated. The letter stated that the 
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licenses should be cancelled with prejudice, that 
Mortensen and Tredway had acted against the best 
interest of the company, and each had a debit bal-
ance with the company. The Insurance Department 
informed the President of Reliance of the letter 
from Licoa and placed the burden of whether or 
not the licenses of Mortensen and Tredway under 
Reliance should continue on the President of Reli-
ance. The Insurance Department terminated the 
licenses of Mortensen and Tredway under Licoa. 
The President of Reliance entered into a contract 
with Mortensen and Tredway other than a contract 
which they had been negotiating at the time of re-
ceipt of the information of the President of Reliance 
from the Insurance Commissioner concerning the 
letter from Licoa. Mortensen and Tredway then 
filed this action against Licoa, Bullard, and Caf-
ferty and seeking damages on the grounds that they 
had been defamed. The jury returned a verdict 
against Licoa, Bullard, and Cafferty awarding Mor-
tensen and Tredway damages in the sum of $8,500.-
00. This appeal was taken from the refusal of the 
trial Judge to dismiss the cause of action of Mor-
tensen and Tredway at the close of their case and 
a motion for a directed verdict against Mortensen 
and Tredway. 
Mortensen started to work for Licoa about 
August 15, 1954. (R 185). Tredway was first em-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ployed by Licoa about the middle of September, 
1954 (R 207-208). 
About the first week of October, 1954 (R 93 
& R 187) Mortensen and Tredway approached ~e­
liance for an agency directors position (R 186). Mr. 
Salisbury, President of Reliance (R 92), at the first 
meeting with Mortensen and Tredway said that it 
would be necessary to investigate Mortensen and 
Tredway thoroughly before anything was done about 
a contract (R 93). Mr. Salisbury also stated that 
Mortensen and Tredway should investigate Reliance 
(R 93). 
Salisbury then investigated Mortensen and 
Tredway and at a second meeting of Mortensen and 
Tredway and Salisbury, Salisbury said it looked 
like an agency supervisor ·contract could be entered 
into with Mr. Mortensen and Tredway (R 94). No 
contract was made at the time of the second meeting 
(R 94). 
Between the time- of the second meeting and a 
third meeting of Mortensen and Tredway and Salis-
bury, Salisbury received a call from the State In-
surance Department ( R 95). The call was from 
Mrs. Burns, the license clerk of the State Depart-
ment of Insurance (R 97). Mrs. Burns informed 
Salisbury about a letter from Licoa which set out 
the termination with prejudice of the license of Mor-
tensen and Tredway (R 97). Salisbury saw the let-
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ter at a later date in the file of the State Insurance 
Commissioners office ( R 97). 
At a third meeting of Mortensen, Tredway, and 
Salisbury, about the 17th or 20th of October, the 
fact that Salisbury had received some information 
would make it inadvisable for him as President of 
teh company to enter into a general supervisory 
contract with Mortensen and Tredway (R 98), a 
·general supervisory contract would have to be based 
on a general agency contract until Mortensen and 
Tredway could prove that they were capable of 
handling the job (R 98). 
Mortensen and Tredway were licensed by Re-
liance on October, 13, 1954 (R 107). Mortensen was 
licensed under Reliance up u11til the tir.ae of the 
trial of this action (R 106-107). Tredway was li-
censed by Reliance through March, 1955 (R 74) at 
which time he was dismissed because of a conflict of 
personalities ( R. 211-212). 
Cafferty made a statement to Btlllard and Li-
coa that while Mortensen and Tredway were en1-
ployed by Licoa they atten1pted to recruit salesmen 
of Licoa to go to work for Reliance (R 14) and that 
Mortensen and Tredway had sent samples of sales 
materials of Licoa's to Reliance (R 14). These state-
ments of Cafferty caused Bullard to write the In-
surance Commissioner a letter ( R 17) . The letter 
written by Bullard was as follows: 
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"Also please cancel with prejudice the 
licenses of Alfred B. Tredway and R. H. Mor-
tensen, whose actions were not in the best 
interest of the company. Our books indicate 
an agency debit of $89.75 on R. H. Morten-
sen, and $428 on A. B. Tredway." (R 189) 
The letter vvas dated October 15, 1954 (R 1 & 
R4). 
The jury returned a special verdict finding as 
follows: The defendant Cafferty made a statement 
to the defendant Bullard and the defendant Licoa 
saying that while Mortensen and Tredway wei'e 
employed by Licoa they atten1pted to recruit sales-
men of Licoa to go to work for Reliance and (R 14) 
that such statement (R 15) was false~ That Caf-
ferty made a statement to Bullard and Licoa that 
Mortensen and Tredway had sent samples of the 
sales material of Licoa to Reliance (R 14). That the 
statement of Cafferty that Mortensen and Tredway 
while agents for Licoa, attempted to recruit sales-
rnen from Licoa to go to work for Reliance defam-
ing the defendants Mortensen and Tredway (R 16) 
and the statement of Cafferty that the plaintiffs 
sent samples of sales materials to Reliance also 
defamed Mortensen and Tredway ( R 16). That the 
statements of Cafferty concerning the recruiting 
of salesmen and the furnishing of samples of sales 
materials to Reliance vvere the proximate cause of 
the writing and mailing of the letter from Bullard 
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and Licoa to the Insurance Commissioner ( R 17) . 
That lVIortensen and Tredway did not act against 
the best interest of Licoa (R 18). The jury found 
that there was a debit balance on the books of the 
company Licoa on October 14, 1954 but that Mor-
tensen had no debit balance on the books of the com-
pany on October 15, 1954 ( R 18). That the state-
ment that Tredway had a debit balance did not de-
fame him, (R 19) but the statement Mortensen had 
a debit balance on the books of the company did de-
fame him. That the statement that Mortensen (R 
19) and Tredway did not act in the best interest of 
the ·company defamed both Mortensen and Tredway 
(R 19). It was found that at least one of the state-
ments which defamed Mortensen and Tredway were 
made maliciously by Cafferty ( R 20). That the 
letter sent the Insurance Commissioner sent by Bul-
lard and Licoa was written with malice on the part 
of Bullard. The jury awarded as follows: The plain-
tiff, Tredway, $500.00 general damages (R 21). 
The plaintiff Mortensen $1,000.00 general damages. 
Special damages for loss of a supervisory contract 
with Reliance was awarded to Mortensen and Tred-
way in the sum of $5,000.00 (R 21) and as punative 
damages Mortensen and Tredway were awarded 
the sum of $2,000.00 jointly. (R 21). 
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STATEMENT OF POINT 
POINT I 
IT IS THE DU'TY OF THE INSURER TO PRE-
SERVE INVI'OLATE THE INTEGRITY OF INSUR-
ANCE. A LETTER FROM AN INSURER TO THE IN-
SURANCE COMMISSIONER MAKING C H A R G E S 
AGAINST AGENTS GOING TO THEIR ELIGIBILITY 
TO WORK UNDER A LICENSE UNDER A DIFFER-
ENT COMPANY, SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY PRIVI-
LEGED IN THE INTEREST OF PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE TO 
DENY A MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT BASED UPON A COMMUNICATION SENT 
IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING THE INTEG-
RITY OF INSURANCE. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS THE DUjTY OF THE INSURER TO PRE-
SERVE INVIOLATE THE INTEGRITY OF INSUR-
ANCE. A LE'TTER FROM AN INSURER TO THE IN-
SURANCE COMMISSIONER MAKING CHARGES 
AGAINST AGENTS GOING TO THEIR ELIGIBILITY 
TO WORK UNDER A LICENSE UNDER A DIFFER~ 
ENT COMPANY, SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY PRIVI-
LEGED IN THE IN!TEREST OF PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND TT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE TO 
DENY A MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT BASED UPON A COMMUNICATION SENT 
IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING THE INTE.G-
RITY OF INS'URANCE. 
On October 15, 1954 Mortensen and Tredway 
were licensed as agents of Reliance and Licoa. On 
that date, Bullard wrote to the Insurance Commis-
sioner requesting the termination of their license 
under Licoa. Coupled with the request for termina-
tion of the license with Licoa were certain allega-
tions in the nature of a complaint against Morten-
sen and Tredway. The Complaint was treated by 
the Insurance Department as a complaint to a suf ... 
ficient degree that it was the basis of a telephone 
call by the insurance department to Reliance, the 
other company under which Mortensen and Tred-
way were licensed. The insurance department left 
any decision to be made up to the discretion of Re-
liance. Had the complaint beeh treated properly 
by the Insurance Department and had a proper 
10 
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hearing been held, there would have been no question 
as to absolute privilege of the communication from 
Licoa to the Insurance Commissioner. The failure 
of the Insurance Department to observe proper pro-
cedure, and instead leaving the determination of 
the continuance of the licenses of Mortensen and 
·Tredway to Reliance, should not be the basis of de-
stroying absolt1te privilege of communication of 
complaints to the Insurance Commissioner and the 
allowing of a recovery by Mortensen and Tredway 
against those reporting to the Insurance Depart-
ment a proper complaint. To deny absolute privilege 
to such communications destroys the intent and 
purpose of the Insurance Code in controlling agents. 
The communication should be given the same abso-
lute privilege as a complaint filed in a proper court 
but which does not state a cause of action. Such 
absolute privilege is essential to the preservation of 
proper policing of the insurance industry. 
:That the insurance business is affected by pub-
lic interest and it is the duty of the insurer to pre-
serve inviolate the integrity of insurance as shown 
by the provisions of Section 31-1-8 UCA, 1953 
which provided as follows: 
Section 31-1-8, U CA ( 1953) provides : 
"GOVERNMENTAL REGULAITION 
Within the intent of this code the busi-
ness of insurance is one affected with the 
public interest, requiring that all persons be 
11 
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actuated by good fait4, abstain from decep-
tion, and practice honesty and equity in all 
insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the in-
sured and their representatives rests the duty 
of pr~serving inviolate the integrity of in-
surance.'' 
Mortensen and Tredway were licensed by Re-
liance on October 13, 1954. On October 15, 1954 a 
letter was sent to the Insurance Commissioner can-
celling their license with Licoa. The letter contained 
the following language: 
"Also please cancel with prejudice the li-
censes of Alfred B. 1Tredway and R. H. Mor-
tensen, whose actions were not in the best 
interest of the company. Our books indicate 
an agency debit of $89.75 on R. H. Morten-
sen, and $428 on A.B. Tredway." 
'That such was a charge against Mortensen 
and Tredway going to their eligibility to work for 
Reliance can be seen upon analysis of the letter and 
the facts which occured. Cancellation with preju-
dice in that the relationship between the insurer 
and the agent was not as it should be, namely a good 
relationship. Such a bad relationship can reflect on 
the company which is a part of the insurance in-
dustry and in turn reflecting on the industry in a 
bad light which is contrary to the intent and mean-
ing of the Insurance Code. 
Not working in the best interest of the com-
pany gives rise to an inference that it would place 
12 
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Licoa, a part of the insurance business, in disrepute. 
Placing a company in disrepute has repercussions 
throughout the insurance business. It being a matter 
of common knowledge in that the failure or failures 
of one insurance company can shake the faith of 
the public in the insurance business as a whole. 
This again is contrary to the intent and purpose 
of the Insurance Code. 
Setting out the debit balance also goes to the 
ability of Mortensen and !Tredway to serve the in-
dustry. The debit balance shown could have arisen 
from any of several ways. The manner in which a 
debit balance has arisen should be discovered and 
corrected. Further, a deficiency left unpaid in a 
small company is in itself not in the best interest 
of the company. Such a deficiency affects the fi-
nancial standing of a small company adversely 
which can affect the industry as a whole because 
of the repercussions which can occur. 
The Insurance Department was aware of the 
question raised going to the ability of Mortensen 
and 'Tredway to act as agents. 'The act of the Insur-
ance Department calling Reliance and informing 
that company of the charges made and leaving the 
decision up to Reliance of whether or not Reliance 
wanted to continue them as agents leaves no other 
conclusions to be drawn than that the letter was in-
terpreted as a charge against Mortensen and Tred-
13 
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way's qualifications to be licensed to work for an-
other company. 
It should be pointed out that there is a distinc-
tion to be made between the cancellation of Morten-
sen's and Tredway's licenses under Licoa and a 
charge going to their ability to work for Reliance. 
Upon receipt of the letter from Licoa, the In-
surance Department could have chosen one of the 
following courses of conduct: ( 1) ;The insurance 
commissioner could have issued an order to Mor-
tensen and ·Tredway for them to show cause why 
the license under Reliance should not be cancelled. 
A hearing could have then been had, and a deter-
mination of fact been made. Such procedure would 
have all of the ear marks of a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding. 
(2) The Insurance Commissioner could have 
ordered a hearing and based upon findings of such 
hearing entered an appropriate order and, if such 
were warranted, Mortensen and Tredway licenses 
could have been revol{ed. This again would have 
been a quasi-judicial proceeding. 
( 3) The Insurance Commissioner could have 
revoked the licenses of both Mortensen a11d Tredway 
and given each of then1 notice. Mter the notice of 
such revocation Mortensen and Tredway could have 
demanded a hearing as provided by the code and 
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the revocation continue in effect. This would have 
been analogous to the Complaint having been filed, 
a default judgment entered, and a motion having 
been made for renewal of the default. This apparent 
reason for the provision under this procedure under 
the Code is to permit the Insurance Commissioner 
to take immediate action to prevent persons not 
conducting themselves properly from continuing 
their misconduct. While it is a summary proceeding 
it is no less quasi-judiciaL Under the above possible 
procedures to have been followed, the letter from 
Licoa to the department is analogous to a complaint 
being filed in a law suit. A hearing is provided for, 
a determination based upon such hearing is provided 
for, an appropriate written order is provided for, 
and an Appeal can be taken. Such a complaint 
should be absolutely privileged. 
The possible action of an order to show cause 
could have been had under the following provisions 
of UCA, ( 195'3) : 
Section 31-4-4. POWERS OF A COMMIS-
SIONER-HEARINGIS 
( 1) 'The commissioner may hold a hearing 
for any purpose he deems proper. 
Section 31-4-5 SHOW CAUSE NOTICE 
( 1) If any person is entitled to a hearing 
by any provision of this code before any pro-
posed action is taken, the notice of the pro-
posed action may be in the form of a notice to 
15 
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show cause stating that the proposed action 
may be taken unless such perso!l ~~ows. cause 
at a hearing to be held as specified In the 
notice, why the proposed action should not 
be taken. 
The possible procedure by way of ordering a 
hearing could have 'been had under the provisions 
of Section 31-4-1 set out above. 
The procedure for the revocation of the license 
and the demand for hearing are provided for by 
the following code provisions. 
Section 31-17-50, UCA (1953) provides: 
."LICEN'SE - SUSPENSION, REVOCATION 
OR DENIAL-GROUNDS 
( 1) :The commissioner may suspend, 
revoke, or refuse to renew any license issued 
under this chapter or any surplus line bro-
ker's license as provided for in chapter 15 of 
this code, or for any of the following causes: 
(a) for any cause for which issuance 
of the license could have been refused had it 
then existed and been known to the commis-
. 
sioner; 
(b) if the licensee wilfully violates or 
knowingly participates in the violation of any 
provision of this code ; 
(c) * * * * 
(d) * * * * 
(e) if the licensee has, with intent to 
deceive, materially misrepresented the terms 
of effect of any insurance contract; or has 
16 
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* * * * 
* * * * 
(h) if in the conduct of his affai~s un-
der the license, the licensee has shown himself 
to be, and is so deemed by the commissioner, 
incompetent, or untrustworthy, a source of 
injury and loss to the public; 
Section 31-4-1, UCA (1953) provides: 
POWERS OF COMMISSIONER-HEARINGS 
(1) * * * * 
(2) * * * * 
(1) * * * * 
He shall hold a hearing 
( 1 ) if required by any provision of this 
code, or 
(2) upon written demand for a hear-
ing made by any person aggrieved by any act 
or threatened act or failure of the commis-
sioner to act, if such failure is deemed an act 
under any provision of this code, or by any 




* * * * 
* * * * 
The questions to 'be answered with regard to 
absolute privilege are ( 1) whether or not an occa-
sion existed or the statement and (2) whether or 
not the matter complained of was pertinent to the 
17 
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occasion. Absolute privilege is given those occasions 
which are so important to the public good that the 
law holds that nothing which may be written with 
probable cause under the sanction of the occasion 
with probable cause, whether with or without malice 
can be libel. The pertinency of the matter to the 
occasion determines the question of whether or not 
the privilege applies. The Insurance Code of- the 
State of Utah regulates the issuance, renewal and 
revocation of licenses for agents. The commissioner 
of insurance is given full jurisdiction in the pre-
mises. The inquiry is limited to the cause shown or 
the charge made. A test of the pertinency is afford-
ed. The party complainant is involved in the show-
ing of good cause for the revocation of the license. 
A hearing by the insurance commissioner is pro-
vided for. The hearing involves an opposite party, 
namely, the defendant or agent whose license is 
being revoked. The hearing provided for is a legal 
hearing and notice to the defendant is in1plied and 
specifically provided for. The act with respect to the 
revocation of the insurance agent's license clothes 
the Insurance Commissioner with attributes similar 
to those of a court and i11 effect makes the Insur-
ance Commissioner a court to detern1ine the matter 
of revocation. 
The privilege or in1n1unity applies wherever 
there is an authorized inquiry which, though not 
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before a court of justice, is before a tribunal which 
has similar attributes. The basis of privilege is pub-
lic policy. The commissioner with respect to agent's 
licenses has the attributes similar to those of a court, 
and public policy requires that immunity be accord-
ed to the statements of the parties too, and wit-
nesses in an investigation of this sort. 
Persons dealing with insurance agents are un-
informed persons and the procedure for the grant-
ing and revocation of agent's license is for the pro-
tection of such people. The Insurance Commissioner 
should have every facility for informing himself as 
to insurance agents, their conduct, their character 
and everything concerning the agent which may 
have some bearing on his conduct in dealing with 
the uninformed persons of the general public. One 
of the facilities that should be afforded the Insur-
ance Commissioner and the procedure for the revo-
cation of licenses as well as the granting of licenses 
is that of privilege of comrnunication to the Insur-
ance Commissioner. 
Insurance companies and others interested in 
the conduct of agents and the insurance industry 
and those dealing with the insurance industry should 
be encouraged to bring to the attention of the In-
surance Commissioner the derilection of such agents. 
The intent of Title 31, UCA ( 1953) to protect in-
surers and the general public would be obstructed, 
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if those instituting or participating in proceedings 
to bring about the revocation of the license of an 
unworthy agent may be subjected by reason of their 
statements to suit for libel or a suit for slander. The 
statute throws around such proceeding before the 
Insurance Commissioner safeguards similar to those 
hedging proceedings before a court of justice. There 
should be the same immunity in both tribunals. 
In this case, the occasion for the statements 
by the agents of the defendant company was the 
written request for the revocation of the licenses 
of the plaintiffs. Such occasion was in the nature 
of the commencement of a proceeding before the 
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Utah. The 
matter complained of was pertinent to the occasion. 
The inferences which were drawn by the plaintiffs 
in this action tend to point out the character of 
those persons whose licenses should be terminated 
and to whom licenses to solicit applications for in-
surance should be denied, that such is pertinent to 
the proceeding involved should need no elaboration. 
The very purpose of the provisions of the code with 
respect to the licensing of agents indicate that only 
persons having the character to deal with the general 
public should be granted a license. 
See, Independent Life Insurance Con1pany v. 
Rodgers, Sup. Ct. of Te11n., 1933, 55 S W 2nd 767, 
where an agent had gone to work for a second com-
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pany and the first company complained of a defi-
ciency and it was held there was absolute privilege 
as to the letter to the Insurance Commissioner. 
Also see, Independent Life Insurance Company 
v. Hunter, Sup. Ct. of 'Tenn., 1933, 63 S.W. 2nd 668, 
where it was held there was conditional privilege 
only as the agent had not been licensed under an-
other company and as a result the insurance com-
missioner did not have jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mortensen and Tredway were licensed as agents 
for two companies, Licoa and Reliance. Licoa r~­
quested the cancellation of Mortensen and Tredway 
licenses under Licoa. Coupled with the cancellation 
of the licenses under Licoa was a charge going to 
the ability of Mortensen and Tredway to be licensed 
as agents of the other company and all companies. 
That the charge went to their ability to serve as 
agents is evidenced by the conduct of the Insurance 
Department and the conduct of Reliance. Writings 
made in quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely 
privileged. The charge made was a charge made in 
a quasi-judicial proceedings and should be absolutely 
privileged. To hold that the communication from 
Licoa to the Insurance Commissioner is not absolu-
tely privileged would prevent all companies from 
making complaints against agents and would have 
the affect of destroying the procedure set up for 
the policing of agents of insurers and the public 
would be denied the protection provided by the pro-
cedure. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
REESE C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Appellants 
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